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We fish too much, and by doing so, we threaten marine ecosystems and people’s
livelihoods. But the curious thing is: we have known this for a long time. Nonetheless,
we continue to overfish. How is that possible? Why can we not stop? This paper
recounts our search for an answer. We start by giving an overview of how scientists
explain overfishing, and suggest that the riddle of its obduracy has not been addressed
systematically. We conceptualize overfishing as an unplanned and unintended outcome
of a chain of interrelated social and ecological events. We then analyze the chain of
events leading to overfishing for two typical cases – the groundfish fishery in the
Gulf of Maine and the South African abalone (Haliotis midae, Haliotidae) fishery – and
two atypical cases where overfishing has stopped or been substantially reduced – the
Patagonian and Antarctic toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides, Nototheniidae and
Dissostichus mawsoni, Nototheniidae) fishery in the Southern Ocean, and the Atlantic
cod (Gadus morhua, Gadidae) fishery in the Barents Sea. Studying and comparing
these cases reveals no sufficient set of factors to explain the persistence of overfishing.
Rather, distinct pathways emerge from a concatenation of proximate and remote
factors, leading to and sustaining overfishing. Understanding these pathways and
their mechanisms can assist in locating leverage points for intervention aimed to
stop overfishing.
Keywords: Overfishing; Causal complexity; Social-ecological regime; Proximate and
remote factorsIntroduction: old news
In September 2012 the US Department of Commerce classified New England’s ground-
fish fishery a disaster. Granting New England’s fishery this low status followed from
recent studies showing that the groundfish stocks had not recovered despite austere
regulations over the last 15 years (NOAA 2012). The suggested 70% catch reductions
needed to restore the stocks would prove detrimental for the dwindling number of
groundfish fishers and their communities. A likely reason for the slow recovery of
New England’s groundfish stocks is that they have simply been overfished for too long
(Acheson 2011; Acheson and Gardner 2014). New England is by no means an excep-
tion; numerous studies show how overfishing remains a significant and persistent
threat to marine fish populations (Worm et al. 2009) despite recent examples of
populations recovering and rebuilding (Hilborn 2007).
Many of the marine ecosystems worldwide that are listed as vulnerable have reached this
point after centuries of overfishing (Roberts 2007). Indeed, overfishing has been a consistent2014 Boonstra and Österblom; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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Middle Ages when fishers emptied European rivers and estuaries of sturgeon and
salmon (Barrett et al. 2004). In 1289, King Philip IV of France complained: “every river
and waterside of our realm, large and small, yields nothing due to the evil of fishers and
the devices of their contriving” (Roberts 2007, p. 25). The ensuing crisis in the European
freshwater fish supply in the 11th and 12th century was a prelude to a cascade of
similar stories of overfishing in seas around the globe: from the collapse of whaling
in the 19th century to the cod crisis in Newfoundland in the beginning of the 1990s
(Roberts 2007).
What is remarkable is that people have long been aware of the dangers of overfishing.
When the otter trawl was used for the first time in the United Kingdom in the 19th
century it caused a storm of protest from fishers who were afraid that trawling would
decimate stocks and destroy the sea floor (Thurstan et al. 2013). There are even exam-
ples of pre-modern fisheries governance trying to limit fishing effort, such as in 1668
when the General Court of Massachusetts ordered that: “no man shall henceforth kill
any codfish, hake, haddock, or Pollock, to be dried for sale in the month of December or
January, because of their spawning time” (Bolster 2008, p. 41).
But if overfishing is indeed such an old problem, and if the negative consequences for
society and nature have always been so obvious and well-known, why do we - in the
21st century - still fail to put an end to it? To illustrate this point: from the 1950s up to
this day fishing intensity has redoubled (Watson et al. 2013), despite the poor status of
many of the global fisheries (Worm et al. 2009). In this paper, we present our search
for answers to this riddle; answers that explain why overfishing is so difficult to stop.
To this purpose we first conceptualize overfishing as an unplanned and unintended
outcome of a chain of interrelated social and ecological events, and consider how
earlier studies have dealt with this complex causality. We focus in particular on the
ideas of ‘ratchets’ (Pitcher 2000), ‘marine systems’ (Perry et al. 2011) and ‘regimes’
(Howarth et al. 2013). Based on this brief review we introduce a distinction between
proximate and remote causal factors. In the remaining part of the paper we present a
study of the historical co-development of fisheries, marine governance, and marine eco-
systems of the groundfish fishery in New England, the abalone fishery in South Africa,
the toothfish fishery in the Southern Ocean, and the cod fishery in the Barents Sea.
The final sections of the paper discuss the results of the analysis for our current
knowledge of overfishing.
Metaphors
Sumaila and Pauly recently presented an insightful image of our common failure to
prevent overfishing. They argue that these failures resemble a ‘march of folly’ (Sumaila
and Pauly 2011). The metaphor usefully captures the collective failure to manage fish-
eries. A march is an organised, social activity and proceeds steadily and relentlessly.
Moreover, a march implies that no individual is in charge. It is as if the collective group
becomes a single entity that moves in a regular and singular direction: the march, in
other words, produces a “merger between self and the surrounding group” (McNeill
1997, p. 10). The metaphor works less well, however, to capture the obduracy of over-
fishing. Marches are typically used to create social cohesion and discipline in groups of
individuals (McNeill 1997). In contrast, the obduracy of overfishing seems to be more a
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metaphor somewhat. Imagine that the march is not performed by a drilled platoon of
soldiers but by a group of chained prisoners: a so-called chain gang. A chain gang is
not well ordered or drilled. Some prisoners walk slowly, others faster; some lean to the
right, others to the left; some trip, taking others with them in their fall. But all of them
remain chained together at hands and feet. No one stands outside and no one is in
charge. This vivid image of the cumulative effects of people’s dependence on each other
(to which we would also add people’s dependence on nature) comes from the sociolo-
gist Elias. He invokes the image to highlight that people often fail to comprehend the
larger chains of dependence that they form together. “[…] being hemmed in and moved
uncomprehendingly hither and thither in ways which none of them intended, they
cannot help being preoccupied with the urgent, narrow and parochial problems which
each of them has to face … They are too deeply involved to look at themselves from
without.” (Elias 1956, p. 232).
The image of marching in a chain gang is useful because it highlights two aspects of
overfishing that are currently missing from conventional analysis and explanation. First,
the image points to the extensive, global web of interdependencies stemming from eco-
nomic, political, social, and ecological relations between fish, fishers, industries, govern-
ments and consumers, which is also referred to as the “seafood supply chain” (Pramod
et al. 2014). The totality of these interdependencies between people and the rest of
nature can be thought of as a social-ecological system (Berkes and Folke 1998). Moreover,
the image also highlights that this social-ecological system exists semi-autonomous
from the people and organisms that populate it. When an increasing number of people
and organisms become interdependent on each other, the potential for individuals, or
specific groups, to control the effects and outcomes of their interaction with each other,
or with nature, diminishes. This is why and when the social-ecological system gains rela-
tive autonomy from the plans and intentions of any of the individuals or groups involved
(Elder-Vass 2010). The social-ecological system exists because of the interdependencies
between people and nature, but “takes a course which none of the individual[s] has
planned, determined or anticipated. On the contrary, the unplanned course of [the
social-ecological system] repeatedly influences the moves of each individual player” (Elias
1978, p. 95). This is a crucial insight because it means that to explain the collective
outcome of human behavior, such as overfishing, one needs to include the dynamic of
social-ecological interaction in time as an explanatory variable in the analysis. The second
insight of the chain gang metaphor refers to the way we conventionally think about
the causes and solutions to overfishing. As in Elias’ image we not only have difficulty
controlling the social-ecological system of which we are part (which produces overfishing),
we also have difficulties perceiving it.
Economists, for example, have argued that overfishing is primarily the result of a pol-
itical failure to radically privatize the use of marine environments, which they consider
as an ‘open access property’ (Runolfsson 1997). Others point to technological creep,
the continued growth of overall fishing capacity, as the main cause of overfishing
(Marchal et al. 2007). Another cause is found in the collective amnesia and shortsighted-
ness when it comes to the perception and valuation of marine biomass and biodiversity.
Included here is Pauly’s (1995) shifting baseline syndrome, but also the failure to eco-
nomically value marine ecosystem services. Another cause for overfishing is found in
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fleets (World Bank 2009). These subsidies encouraged the growth of fishing capacity
and, in so doing, contributed to overfishing. These answers are not wrong, to be sure,
but they tend to highlight only one or a few single factors that are then supposed to be
applicable in all cases all the time. Conventional diagnosis of overfishing tends to focus
on separate parts of the marine social-ecological systems (social, economic, political or
ecological aspects) (Boonstra and Nhung 2012), and assume that fixing these will solve
the issue, while overfishing develops from a complex, historical concatenation of social
and ecological aspects (Howarth et al. 2013). Still, there are also studies that have
highlighted the causal complexity underlying the obduracy of overfishing. It is to these
studies that we turn next.
The causal complexity of overfishing
A number of recent studies have used a holistic systems perspective to understand the
stability and change of marine ecosystems (Ommer et al. 2012; Perry et al. 2011;
Charles 2012). These studies show that marine systems seldom grow gradually towards
long-term stable, climax conditions, but instead tend to bifurcate between different
‘stable states’ (Howarth et al. 2013). The bifurcation between alternative stable states is
called ‘a regime’. When social-ecological systems change within a regime it means that
they “absorb and utilize or even benefit from perturbations and changes that attain it,
and so to persist without a qualitative change in the system’s structure” (Holling 1973,
p. 3). Pitcher (2000) has identified three causal mechanisms that work like ratchets
and maintain marine ecosystems in degraded conditions. “Odum’s ratchet” highlights
the effects of (over)fishing as a selective force on ecosystems when it removes the
apex predators from marine food chains. These removals are often permanent, and
can result in tropic cascades or regime shifts favoring fish with higher turnover rates
(Steneck 2012). “Pauly’s ratchet” refers to the human tendency to fail to notice
gradual change, and to set goals for marine ecological restoration that are based on
personal perceptions (Pauly 1995). “Ludwig’s ratchet” refers to the increase in fishing
capacity through loans, which can only be repaid with catching more fish (Ludwig
et al. 1993). More fishing effort leads to reduced stock abundance, which then
requires more investments in fishing capacity to make up for the loss in catches (and
to pay off the loans).
Using these ideas, it becomes possible to consider overfishing as a regime, i.e. a rela-
tively stable state, in which a degraded marine social-ecological system persists despite
changes. The stability or change of an ecological regime is often the result of specific
interactions between the drivers of an ecosystem (slow variables), and external shocks
(fast variables) (Nyström et al. 2012). Such a two-level causality approach shares many
similarities with analyses of change in social or political regimes (Mahoney and Snyder
1999), that frequently make a distinction between structural and agential causes.
Structural causes refer to features of social structures, such as institutions, cultures, or
value systems, while agential causes highlight the causal role of people’s individual
choices and strategies.
For this article we use these ideas about two-level causality to make a distinction be-
tween proximate and remote causal factors (Geist and Lambin 2002, see also Wilen
2006) that, we believe, can accommodate both ecological and social theorizing about
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toms” (Wilen 2006), are causes that are temporally and spatially close to the outcome
under scrutiny. They typically include human activities at local levels, such as the expan-
sion of fishing capacity and/or (non)-compliant behavior, but also the actions of other or-
ganisms or natural events (earthquakes, storms, etc.). Remote factors have an origin
remote in time and space from the outcome to be explained, and they cannot be influ-
enced directly by actions in the here and now. These factors can be witnessed over a range
of case studies, which makes them more general. They typically include the ‘causes of
causes’, i.e. the social and ecological factors or conditions that influence the occurrence of
the proximate causes. We argue that proximate factors (i.e. individual human behavior)
produce overfishing, but only through their relation with remote factors (i.e. gradual
ecological changes or social-structural change) (see Table 1).
Tracing overfishing
As the collective causal mechanisms that produce overfishing consist of a set of inter-
acting proximate and remote factors, neither the proximate nor the remote factors
alone are sufficient to generate overfishing; they can only do so through their inter-
action with each other. In other words, both parts are necessary to make the mechan-
ism ‘work’. A method that is frequently used to identify specific causal mechanisms is
process tracing. Process tracing is a within-case method “to identify the intervening
causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent
variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett
2005, p. 206).
An important first step in process tracing is the operationalization of the theoretical
concept into a so-called “systemized definition” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, p. 46). In
this case it means systemizing and operationalizing overfishing as a stable regime.
Österblom et al. (2011) have suggested a simplified visualization of social-ecological
interactions that can transform a relatively sustainable fishery into a relatively unsus-
tainable fishery. A sustainable fishery is defined in this framework as a fishery that can
maintain a stable, relatively high level of biomass, functional management and a high
level of compliance, while an unsustainable fishery includes stable but relatively low
levels of biomass and dysfunctional management with high noncompliance. In accord-
ance with this distinction, we consider overfishing to be ‘yield overfishing’, i.e. a fishery
that “prevents a population from producing as much sustainable yield as it could if less
intensively fished” (Hilborn and Hilborn 2012, 3). Using this definition, we searched the
fisheries science literature for rich case studies that describe and explain in detail
the social and ecological processes that changed fisheries from being sustainable toTable 1 Proximate and structural causal factors in ecological and social regimes
Proximate causal factors Remote causal factors
Ecological regimes External, sudden shocks, such as a
disease outbreak or change in
climate forcing.
Gradual changes in underlying drivers
and feedbacks of marine ecosystems.
Social regimes People’s choices, strategies and actions,
such as fishers’ adoption of new gear
types, or political leaders changing
marine governance.
Gradual changes in social structures,
such as institutional or cultural changes
that influence fishing practices and
marine governance or technological
progress.
Boonstra and Österblom Maritime Studies 2014, 13:15 Page 6 of 20
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/13/1/15unsustainable, and vice versa. Based on these criteria we selected 2 case studies to
represent each situation (four cases in total) from the existing literature on overfishing:
 The abalone fishery in South Africa and the northeast multispecies groundfish
fishery in the United States, which shifted from a relatively sustainable into a
relatively unsustainable stable state.
 The cod fishery in the Barents Sea and the toothfish fishery in the Southern Ocean,
which shifted from a relatively unsustainable into a relatively sustainable stable state.
The second step in process tracing consists of the conceptualization of the causal fac-
tors that produce overfishing. As proximate causal factors we identify overcapacity and
non-compliance (Beddington et al. 2007). The remote causal factors, which are much
more broad, have been categorized conventionally according to three social domains –
civil society, economy, and the state – together with the ecological domain (see Table 2).
According to Goldstone, process tracing entails: “the difficult cognitive feat of figuring
out which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction with which simple
principles of the many that may be at work, would have combined to generate the ob-
served sequence of events” (Goldstone 1991, p. 50). In this case, the ‘initial conditions’
have been identified as sustainable and unsustainable fisheries, while the ‘simple
principles’ (or causal factors) that may be at work have been conceptualised as
combinations of proximate and remote causal factors. This leaves open the third and last
step in a process tracing analysis to which we will now turn: the ‘observed sequence of
events’ in our four cases.From sustainable to unsustainable fishery
The abalone fishery in South Africa
The closure of the South-African abalone fisheries on 1 February 2008 is spectacular
considering that the fishing of abalone used to be sustainable from the 1950s until the
end of the 1980s with relatively low numbers of illegal fishing. In a matter of years it
transformed into a fishery involving organized crime syndicates that created an ‘abalone
crisis’ and, subsequently, the closure of the fishery.
Like most other case studies discussed in this paper, the South-African abalone fish-
ery was originally characterized by open-access. Raemaekers et al. (2011) mention that
when commercial abalone fishing began in 1949 the only management restrictions were
size limits. Commercial abalone fishing is mainly carried out along the Western Cape
with 4–6 divers working from small row boats or twin-engine ski boats. Subsistence
abalone fishing dominated the Eastern Cape and existed as a shore-based fishing activ-
ity. Skin divers collected shells from the shore to complement other livelihood activ-
ities. As a result of the expansion of commercial fishing, commercial landings of
abalone rose to 2800 tons in 1965, but afterwards quickly decreased. This decline in
landings led to the initiation in 1969 of quota management in the form of a TotalTable 2 Proximate and remote causal factors producing the obduracy of overfishing
Proximate causal factors Remote causal factors
Overfishing regime Overcapacity; Non-compliance The Ecology; The Economy; The Civil Society; The State.
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followed by the introduction of fishing licenses, closed seasons, and a reduction of the
limits for bag sizes. The poaching of abalone began with the introduction of these
management restrictions, but it never grew large enough to seriously threaten abalone
with commercial extinction (Steinberg 2005). These measures, together with favorable
natural conditions, stabilized the abalone yields between 600 and 700 tons until the
1990s (Raemaekers et al. 2011).
The end of Apartheid in 1994 influenced the transformation of the abalone fishery in
a number of ways. First of all, it lifted the international trade embargo which greatly
improved the possibilities to sell abalone on global markets, in particular on the Asian
markets. Prices for abalone increased tremendously from USD 10 to USD 32 per kg
whole mass in the early 1990s. At the same time the South African Rand devaluated,
which produced a 12-fold increase in the monetary value of abalone (measured in
Rand) (Steinberg 2005; Raemaekers et al. 2011). The conjuncture of the increase in the
international abalone prices with the radical trade policy change quite suddenly opened
up a profitable global market for South African abalone.
Second, the new political regime raised the expectations of coastal communities that
were previously not able to engage in commercial abalone fishing due to Apartheid pol-
icies (van Sittert et al., 2006). With the new regime and the high abalone prices, subsist-
ence fishers were expecting formal access and user rights to harvest this valuable
marine resource. The government tried to meet these expectations through several
reforms of fisheries policies between 1998 and 2003. Initially these reforms only
involved a reallocation of fishing rights within the existing commercial abalone fishery.
As mentioned, this fishery was predominantly based at the Western Cape and was run
by five white-owned companies. The needs and demands of the subsistence sector were
not recognized, and the reform initially granted formal user rights to only 10% of the
TAC to subsistence fishers (van Sittert et al., 2006). Moreover, as Raemaekers et al.
(2011) mention, the reallocation process was long, cumbersome and lacked stakeholder
consultation. Moreover, and not surprisingly, stakeholders were suspicious that the
whole reform process was corrupt and only benefitted elites (Hauck, 2009). As a result,
different groups of subsistence fishers that had not received the formal rights that they
felt entitled to became engaged in illegal fishery (Hauck, 2009).
Third, the large profits that could be made with the abalone fishery attracted Chinese
crime syndicates that had already established extensive South-African networks, trading
shark fins, drugs and people (Steinberg 2005). Taken together, these factors –
democratization, high prices, a failed fisheries policy reform, and the presence of orga-
nized crime – helped to create a major illegal fishery for abalone in the 1990s and
2000s (Raemaekers et al. 2011). The illegally caught abalone was sold on a growing
black market, mostly in Asia (Hauck and Sweijd, 1999).
Alongside these social changes, the marine ecosystem also began to change. Stock
assessments from 1988 until 1993 discovered that West Coast rock lobster (Jasus
lalandii, Palinuridae) moved southwards and increased predation on juvenile abalone
(Tarr et al., 1996). The lobsters also preyed on urchin beds and, in so doing, destroyed
sheltering possibilities for the abalone. The lobster migration hampered the abalone
recruitment and consequently contributed to the stock decline (Blamey et al., 2010;
Day and Branch, 2002).
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a number of interventions in the early 2000s that used both coercion and market-based
incentives to sustain the abalone fishery (for more details, see Hauck, 2009; Raemaekers
et al. 2011). Despite these efforts, Raemaekers et al. (2011) conclude in their review that
poaching continued unabated. First of all, there was a lack of communication and
consultation with stakeholders from the coastal communities, which created a lot of
misunderstanding, confusion and suspicion and delegitimized policies in the eyes of
fishers. Second, there were instances of corruption where crime syndicates bribed gov-
ernment officials. Third, the large investments in enforcement lacked continuity and
funding. Finally, the abalone poachers adapted. Snorkeling from the shore performed
by individual divers was replaced with organized offshore scuba diving from motor-
boats, and the poachers also moved to new coastal areas or poached at night. The tech-
nology that allowed these adaptations, including the evasion of law enforcement, were
high-speed vessels, cell phones and GPS equipment (Raemaekers et al. 2011).
The failure to stop poaching meant that South African fisheries management lost
much of its legitimacy. Fishers with legal rights to catch abalone were increasingly
facing restrictions and therefore diminishing profitability, while illegal fishery continued
unabatedly. Legal fishers thus felt that they bore the costs of stricter rules, while illegal
fishers gained greater profits because the rules were not enforced and the poachers
faced less competition from the legal fishery. Legal fishers had an incentive to allow
poaching to continue since the illegal abalone that was seized was sold, and contrib-
uted to the annual government budget. Moreover, commercial abalone fishers found
that the fisheries reform had negatively influenced their profitability. Granting more
fishing rights only meant that they had to share a diminishing annual TAC. For these
reasons legal right holders (both commercial and subsistence fishers) also engaged in
the illegal abalone fishery (Raemaekers et al. 2011). Hauck (2009) therefore concludes
that the government intervention in the South African abalone fishery alienated legal
fishers and thereby indirectly and unintentionally contributed to the prevalence of
poaching.
New England groundfish fishery
The New England groundfish fishery was not always considered a disaster (see Introduction).
In 1976, when the US congress passed the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act
(FCMA), the future looked much brighter than today. With this Act in hand, the Federal
Government claimed ownership of a 3–200 mile zone around its coast. Until then the
Gulf of Maine (GOM) was under open-access. It was used by US and Canadian fishers,
but also European and Soviet fishers (Bubier and Rieser 1986; Österblom and Folke 2015).
The foreign fleet increased overall fishing pressure tremendously since North-American
fleets also intensified, as they were afraid to lose out in the competition with the for-
eigners. To survey the effects of fishing, the US government began bottom trawl surveys,
which quickly revealed the precarious situation of most of the GOM stocks (Layzer 2006).
The foreign fleet activities, together with the rapid decline in fish stocks and the wholesale
impotency of transnational agreements made in the International Commission for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), increased the urgency to act.
With the FCMA in place the US could now ban foreign fleets from fishing in
their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Part of the FCMA was the creation of the
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representatives of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS); the heads of the state
fisheries agencies; and representatives from the fishing sector. The NEFMC was ordered
to draft so-called Fishery Management Plans (FMP). The motives and hopes related to the
instalment of the FCMA and the NEFMC were internally contradictive. People from
the government and fishing sectors saw the exclusive US. jurisdiction over the
offshore fishing grounds as a possibility to keep foreign fishing out and to vitalize the
domestic fleet. The US government granted this wish with the provision of several
subsidies and loans (Hennessey and Healey 2000. Marine scientists, environmental-
ists and civil servants hoped that the new management structure would regulate
fisheries and protect stocks (Hennessey and Healey 2000; Layzer 2006). The
combination of these two contradictory messages – modernization and expansion
of the fisheries while, at the same time, introducing limitations – created a “rush
for permits” (Apollonio and Dykstra 2008, p. 31): 1,200 fishing licenses were
issued in 1977, while in 1979 the number increased to 2,191— a growth of 83%
(Acheson 1984).
The first FMP was created by the NMFS and became notorious for the introduction
of catch quotas for each species of groundfish (Acheson 2011). These quotas were
fished up rapidly and the boats were forced to stay at home by the middle of the year,
which infuriated the fishers. According to their view the fishing pressure in the GOM
substantially decreased with the exclusion of the foreign fleets, which accorded with
the unexpectedly high landings that many experienced (Bubier and Rieser 1986). The
fishers questioned the accuracy of the data that was used to set the quotas. The ensuing
discussions and accusations between the fishers and the NMFS created suspicion and
mistrust that has never really been resolved since then (Hennessey and Healey 2000,
p. 196). The fishers saw the NMFS as “incompetent bureaucrats backed by unreliable
science threaten[ing] their livelihoods” (Layzer 2006, p. 67).
It was this context and atmosphere that made non-compliance a structural feature of
the New England groundfish fishery. King and Sutinen (2010) estimated that 12-24% of
its catch is illegal. Types of non-compliant behaviour include: misrepresenting catches,
smuggling, misrepresenting gear use, excessive discards, not following mesh size, area
or seasonal limitations (Bubier and Rieser 1986; Hennessey and Healey 2000; Brewer
2011). Weak enforcement made non-compliance a persistent structural feature of the
New England groundfish fishery (Acheson 1984; Sutinen et al. 1990), which in turn led
to much more widespread rule breaking. Fishers who under normal conditions would
be inclined to abide by the law also began breaking rules, since “fishers who obeyed the
law caught fewer fish, suffered economic hardship, lost prestige in the eyes of other
fishers, and lost their credibility as effective captains (Miller and Pollnac 1978 cited in
Hennessey and Healey 2000, p. 196). Another important effect of pervasive non-
compliance was that it frustrated the efforts of the NMFS to acquire reliable stock
assessments (Bubier and Rieser 1986).
To resolve this situation the NEMFC, which was dominated by the fishery sector,
introduced in 1982 a new Atlantic Demersal Fishery Plan (ADFP) with the backup of
New England’s members of Congress (Hennessey and Healey 2000; Layzer 2006).
These delegates supported the NEFMC after which the NMFS backed down and
grudgingly accepted NEFMC’s plan. The ADFP excluded quota management and only
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areas and seasonal limits). The council also explicitly assumed that stock conditions were
in much better shape than what the scientific assessments showed (Hennessey and Healey
2000, p. 198). The chairman of the council during those years declared: “Things are not as
bad as they seem. Some years will be lean, some will be fat, but overall you will never really
destroy the resource. […]. You could close the fishery on Georges Bank. In four or five years,
you might have all the codfish anybody could want. In the meantime, you put an enormous
number of people out of business”. (quoted in Layzer 2006, p. 69–70)
Another major event in the recent history of New England’s groundfish fishery was
the decision in 1984 of the International Court to demarcate a new international border
in the GOM between the US and Canada. The New England fishers now became
excluded from the Grand Banks, the Gulf of Saint Lawrence, Labrador, and parts of the
GOM. The effect of this decision was that more and more fishers were crowding the
inshore waters of the GOM. Total catches plummeted between 1982 and 1988 with
30% to 50%, and the spawning stock declined so much that scientists in 1994 believed
it had “collapsed” (Acheson and Gardner 2011, p. 1010).
Revisions of the FCMA in 1989 and 1996 legally obliged the councils to have the con-
dition of the stocks improved as quickly as possible. In New England the Conservation
Law Foundation (CLF) seized on this opportunity to file suit in 1991 and 2003 against the
NEFMC for failing to prevent the overfishing of cod, haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus,
Gadidae) and yellowtail flounder (Pleuronectes ferruginea, Pleuronectidae) in the GOM
(Hennessey and Healey 2000; Layzer, 2006). This policy change and the deteriorating stock
conditions, together with the risk of being sued by environmentalist NGO’s, pressured the
council to impose further limitations during the 1990s. The fishing sector vehemently
opposed these restrictions during the 1990s (Snyder 2006); each new restriction was
fought over (Acheson and Gardner 2011). The council did not give in to these protests
but continued to suggest stricter limitations. It realized that not responding or
responding slowly to new scientific stock assessments could mean losing management
authority and having the federal government stepping in. Or, in the words of Phil
Coates, chairman of the council’s groundfish committee: “If we don’t take action in a
timely manner, this matter is going to be taken out of our hands, and others will take
it for us” (Layzer 2006, p. 73). The management of New England’s groundfish fishery
thus became stricter, especially during the 1990s. Policymakers tried to soften the
effects of these changes for fishing families with the help of Federal assistance
programs, e.g. loan restructuring, community planning grants, job counseling,
restraining grants for individual fishers and buy-outs (Hennessey and Healey 2000).
The most recent form of aid came from the granting of a disaster status in September
2012 by the US Department of Commerce.
From unsustainable to sustainable fishery
Toothfish fishery in the Southern Ocean
Toothfish fishery currently represents the most profitable fisheries in the Southern
Ocean. These fisheries, developed primarily around the sub-Antarctic Islands but
increasingly conducted closer to the Antarctic ice edge, followed after the near eradica-
tion of marine mammals and the depletion of a number of finfish stocks in the region.
A large-scale Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishery for toothfish developed
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unregulated fishery threatened to result in the collapse of these newly discovered and
commercially valuable fish stocks, and endangered seabirds that got trapped in fishing gear.
A number of unique management measures and combined efforts from governments, the
fishing industry and environmental NGOs, led however to a substantial reduction of
non-compliance and improved prospects for sustainable management.
Historical overexploitation of Antarctic fur seals (Arctocephalus gazelle, Otariidae)
and whales led to a dramatic reduction of marine mammals in the Southern Ocean
during the 18th and 19th century (Ainley and Blight 2008). This development is thought
to have contributed to an increase in Antarctic krill (Euphausia superba, Euphausiidae), a
main prey for many marine mammals in the region. Fishing for Marbled rockcod
(Notothenia rosii, Nototheniidae) and Mackerel icefish (Champsocephalus gunnari,
Channichthyidae) began in the late 1960s and 1970s, but these stocks were rapidly
overexploited (Kock 2001, Ainley and Blight 2008). During the 1980s, fishing opera-
tors therefore started to target Antarctic krill. As a source of marine protein, Krill is
critical for the Antarctic food web and recovery of depleted mammal populations
(Croxall and Nicol 2004). The threat of a rapidly increasing krill fishery in the Southern
Ocean in the 1980s contributed to the establishment of the Commission for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), also often termed ‘the
krill commission’.
The establishment of CCAMLR in 1983 led to the closures of many fisheries that had
previously been overexploited (Ainley and Blight 2008). A few years later Soviet vessels,
which had been developing several Antarctic fisheries, including exploratory fisheries
for toothfish, ceased their activities when the Soviet Union collapsed. Instead, Chilean
and Argentinean vessels started to fish for toothfish, most notably around the UK con-
trolled sub-Antarctic islands of South Georgia, in the early 1990s. The UK government
invested substantially in monitoring and enforcement, in part as a consequence of
political sensitivities between Argentina and the UK related to the Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas). In the mid-1990s, IUU fishing, moved eastwards, spreading to South
African, French and Australian territories, thereby representing an international crisis
and a critical issue for CCAMLR to address. In 1997, the scientific committee of
CCAMLR concluded that non-compliance in the toothfish fisheries was leading to
the “likely collapse” of fish stocks and seabirds, but CCAMLR had limited ability to
develop effective policy measures. NGO reports, developed in unconventional
collaborations between fishery officials and the licensed fishing industry, contributed
substantially to an initial reduction of non-compliance (Österblom and Sumaila
2011, Österblom and Folke 2013).
After some time with a relatively compliant fishery, IUU fishery exploitation returned
and increased during the early 2000s. Now, illegal fishing operators were well orga-
nized, with new purpose-built vessels, and coordinated fleets operated by a “hard core”
of professional, non-compliant actors (Agnew 2000, Österblom et al. 2010). Their
operations included refueling vessels, coordination of fleet movements, espionage on
the Australian coastguard and bribery of ports inspectors. The future catches of the
licensed fishing industry were substantially threatened by the increase in IUU, leading
legal fishers to begin investing in the collection and dissemination of information on
IUU fishing (Österblom and Sumaila 2011). The legal industry invested in private
Boonstra and Österblom Maritime Studies 2014, 13:15 Page 12 of 20
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/13/1/15investigations, rewarding schemes for industry informants, public outreach campaigns
and political lobbying to raise public and political awareness. The Coalition of Legal
Toothfish Operators (COLTO) was established and gained observer status in CCAMLR
in 2003, where they managed to contribute to the growing political pressure to reduce
IUU fishing (Österblom and Sumaila 2011).
Subsequent and substantial government investments in offshore monitoring capacity
(surveillance vessels, aircrafts and satellite surveillance), combined with convictions
of illegal fishers, an increase in compliance mechanisms (black-listing of IUU vessels,
an electronic catch documentation scheme to ensure traceability of products, and
vessel monitoring systems), and improved collaboration and information sharing,
has provided substantial deterrents for non-compliance in the Southern Ocean
(Österblom and Bodin 2012). A limited number of illegal vessels are still observed
operating in the region, but there are indications that many vessels have now moved
elsewhere. The reduction of non-compliance in the Southern Ocean is substantially
improving the prospects for recovering fish stocks and seabird populations in the
region (Österblom and Folke 2013).
Barents sea cod fishing
The Barents Sea is one of the most productive marine ecosystems in the world, where
cod, Atlantic herring (Clupea harengus, Clupeidae) and capelin (Mallotus villosus,
Osmeridae) constitute the main commercial species. Large, economically valuable
spawning cod concentrate in Norwegian waters, whereas smaller juvenile (and less
valuable) cod are more abundant in Russian waters. The stock has been jointly
managed by Norway and Russia (the former Soviet Union) since 1977 and despite
challenges from non-compliance in the 2000s, has a biomass that is currently well
within the boundaries of sustainability.
Stocks of right whales (Eubalaena glacialis, Balaenidae) walrus (Odobenus rosmarus,
Odobenidae) and sperm whales (Physeter macrocephalus, Physeteridae) were depleted
in the Barents Sea during the 1800s, and were followed by exploitation of common
minke whales (Balaenoptera acutorostrata, Balaenopteridae) (Nakken 1998). Although
cod fisheries had been conducted for hundreds of years, it only developed as a major
commercial activity with the development of trawl fisheries in the early 1900s (Eide
et al. 2013). The cod stock was at a historical high after the Second World War (Dankel
et al. 2008), but generally decreased until the mid-1970s (Bjørndal and Lindroos 2012).
Norwegian herring stocks instead became the main target species during the 1950s and
60s, but they collapsed in the 1960s following the start of purse seine fisheries (which
used synthetic nets, combined with acoustic instruments and net handling machinery).
Depletion of herring stocks increased purse seiner exploitation of capelin, with
subsequent stock collapses in the 1970s. Capelin is the most important prey for cod,
and this capelin collapse generated poor conditions for cod in the 1970s (Dankel et al.
2008).
The Joint Soviet-Norwegian Fisheries Commission was established in 1975. Both par-
ties had a strong interest to maintain cooperation in this politically sensitive region
across the iron curtain (Eide et al. 2013) and the agreement was mutually beneficial.
Soviet state owned companies were not as concerned about profitability - they did not
benefit from world market prices as all catches were landed in the Soviet Union
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i.e., volume in production rather than profits, resulting in a focus on quantity rather than
value (Eide et al. 2013). The Norwegian market based economy, in turn, was driven by
profitability concerns.
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of a Russian market economy
changed the conditions for cooperation. Russian, private owned companies now oper-
ated under similar incentives for profitability as their Norwegian counterparts. How-
ever, the Russian market (unable to pay world market prices for cod) was not attractive
to the new privately owned Russian companies. Instead, Russian vessels started to in-
crease their activities in Norwegian waters where fish were larger and more valuable
(Eide et al. 2013). Landings of Russian catches in Norway, where the prices for cod
were higher, became permitted in the early 1990s (Eide et al. 2013) and Russian vessel
owners also maintained and repaired their vessels in Norway, resulting in the closure
of Russian onshore fish processing plants, decreasing overall fishing activities in the
Murmansk region and a perception of a crisis in Russian northern fisheries (Ivanova
2005). The collapse of the Soviet Union also resulted in a rapidly increasing overcap-
acity in Russian waters, as the distant water fleet concentrated here (Ivanova 2005).
The collapse also resulted in a termination of state subsidies covering expenses for fuel,
maintenance and other support activities – changes which resulted a dramatic fall in
Russian revenues (Ivanova 2005). Official estimates suggest this resulted in substantial
non-compliance during 1990–1994 (Eide et al. 2013). However, no illegally caught cod
was officially reported during 1995–1999 (Eide et al. 2013) and interviewed Russian
fishermen described Norwegian coast guard inspections as an important deterrent
for non-compliance at the time (Hønneland 2000).
In the early 2000s, Russian President Putin introduced a political reform which cen-
tralized Russian decision-making (Ivanova 2005). The Russian government introduced
a new framework for quota allocation, where quotas were auctioned to the highest
bidder. The auction system, only in effect between 2001 and 2003, has been described as
“one of the most crucial decision-making failures of the federal fisheries administration”
(Ivanova 2005, p.52). The auction system, intended as a cost-recovery scheme, resulted in
many companies going bankrupt and leading to increased non-compliance (Ivanova
2005, Eide et al. 2013). The high value of quotas resulted in the attraction of foreign
investors, criminal elements, corruption and bribery (Ivanova 2005). Official estimates
between 2000 and 2006 indicate substantial illegal catches from both Norwegian and
Russian vessels. The direct mechanisms for high levels of Norwegian non-compliance
are less clear, but may have been associated with Norwegian overcapacity (Standal
2008) combined with decreasing economic activities in northern Norwegian fisheries
(Perry et al. 2011). Other sources suggest substantially higher levels of Russian
non-compliance (Burnett et al. 2008).
Non-compliance during the first decade of this century was however gradually
eliminated through Russian and Norwegian cooperation. Measures taken include a ban
on transshipment to vessels flying flags of convenience, prior notification of landing re-
quirements and seafood industry cooperation. Norway has also entered into a number
of bilateral agreements to ensure port control of cod landings in EU countries,
the Faroe Islands, Russia, Canada, Greenland and Morocco (Burnett et al. 2008).
These initiatives together have contributed to a recent decrease in non-compliance
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diversification of the Norwegian fishing industry, with e.g., the introduction of market
mechanisms (Perry et al. 2011). As a consequence of reduced non-compliance and
improved environmental conditions, the current (measured in 2012) biomass of Barents
Sea cod is higher than ever before, the stock is above existing reference point limits, the
fishing mortality is below the threshold level and many fishing activities are certified by
the Marine Stewardship Council (Fishsource 2013).
Discussion: social-ecological feedbacks generate complex interactions
First we will explain the obduracy of overfishing for our two typical cases: the ground-
fish fishery in New England and the South African abalone fishery. Using the two-level
causal model introduced earlier, we highlight how proximate and remote factors inter-
act to create distinct causal pathways that lead to overfishing. After this exercise we will
contrast these findings with the two atypical cases – the toothfish fishery in the Southern
Ocean, and the cod fishery in the Barents Sea – to see why overfishing in these cases was
less obdurate, and why people succeeded in shifting fisheries onto a causal trajectory
towards sustainable management (Hilborn 2007).
Comparing overfishing in South Africa and New England for the proximate factors
quickly reinforces earlier research that singles out both the existence of overcapacity
and non-compliance as necessary causes. Overcapacity can be observed in South Africa
when in the beginning of the 1990s the fishers’ population was growing extensively,
especially through the growth in the (legal and illegal) subsistence fishery and the
involvement of crime syndicates in abalone fishery. In New England overcapacity
comes into existence at the end of 1970s through a combination of technological
progress, ambiguous fisheries policies, and juridical control over the Gulf of Maine.
Non-compliant behavior is also instrumental in causing overfishing both in South
Africa as well as New England. In the former, non-compliant behavior is observed
for the large group of subsistence fishers and the smaller group of professional illegal
abalone fishers who were connected to international networks of crime. Studies of
fishing in New England show that illegality after the 1970s spreads beyond a small
group of hardcore violators to groups of fishers that under normal circumstances
would comply with regulation (King and Sutinen 2010). The cases clearly show that
these two factors, overcapacity and non-compliance, are individually necessary and
jointly sufficient to cause overfishing. We expect that this conjuncture of necessary,
proximate factors is probably sufficient to also explain overfishing in other parts of
the world.
We now turn to an analysis of the remote factors to explain why these two proximate
factors have become structurally persistent, or obdurate, in both cases. With process
tracing we were able to identify the following remote factors that were causally related with
overcapacity: (1) higher prices; (2) technological progress; (3) subsidies; and (4) reduced fish
abundance. With respect to non-compliance, we identified five remote factors: (1) reduced
fish abundance, here again, because it leads to an illegal race for fish; (2) feelings of relative
deprivation; (3) low legitimacy; (4) low control and enforcement. The relationship be-
tween these remote factors and the proximate factors is characterized by equifinality,
i.e. the remote factors are individually sufficient, but not necessary, for the existence
of either overcapacity or non-compliance. More concretely, this means that specific
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compliance in the two cases.
To explain the obduracy of overfishing in South Africa and New England we need to
take a closer look at the different causal relations that exist between the remote and
proximate factors that we have identified (see Figure 1). In some cases these causal
relations exist with positive feedbacks, which means that overfishing becomes self-
reinforcing (Österblom et al. 2011), possibly explaining why it is often so difficult to
halt overfishing. From our analysis we are able to highlight two of these positive
feedbacks:
Reduced fish abundance-overcapacity-overfishing feedback – Diminishing catches
means that there comes to exist a surplus of fishing capacity. The existence of overcap-
acity creates an incentive to increase fishing effort because fishers will try to get a
return from their investments. This mechanism has alternatively been called ‘Ludwig’s
ratchet’ (Pitcher 2000) or ‘sunk-cost effect’ (Janssen and Scheffer 2004). In combination
with non-compliant behavior it leads to overfishing, which leads to reduced stocks.
Low legitimacy-non-compliance-overfishing feedback – Due to low legitimacy of
fishery policy, fishers do not consider regulation morally binding and fish illegally.
Non-compliant behavior, together with overcapacity, leads to overfishing. Overfishing
leads to the perception that government regulation is failing, which erodes its legitimacy
even further.
What are the implications of this analysis for fisheries management; what interven-
tion possibilities exist that can make overfishing less obdurate? A closer look at the two
atypical cases – the toothfish fishery in the Southern Ocean and the cod fishery in the
Barents Sea is instructive here. These two relatively sustainable regimes also went
through periods when they were relatively unsustainable as a consequence of a combin-
ation of overcapacity and non-compliance. During the early 1990s and 2000s there was
a ‘gold rush’ movement of fisheries to the Southern Ocean, while the early 2000s
showed a peak in illegal catches in the Barents Sea. These periods of overfishing wereFigure 1 A two-level model of overfishing. The arrows indicate causal relations.
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capacity from elsewhere, which resulted in an overshoot of fishing capacity together with
policies that created incentives for non-compliant behavior. Nevertheless, overfishing was
reduced over time: how did this shift come about?
First of all, both cases are located in politically sensitive regions, which means they
have a history of transnational governmental interaction. In the Barents Sea, the
Norwegian government and the former Soviet Union had already established a working
relationship. Similarly, the countries owning parts of the Southern Ocean had already
organized a transnational governmental organization for management: CCAMLR. In
both cases this multi-government deliberation created levels of trust that enabled gov-
ernments to jointly monitor and control fishing effort. Moreover, considerable human
and technical capacity for surveillance existed to address non-compliance, as these
countries put large emphasis on border protection security in these politically sensitive
regions.
A crucial factor in both cases was that multi-government intervention to ban illegal
fishing was discussed and aligned with efforts from the fishing industry and environ-
mental NGOs. Second, governments were able to reduce illegal fishing due to charac-
teristics of the toothfish and the cod fisheries. The fishery in the Southern Ocean is
performed by a relatively small group of companies, which means that the conditions
for control and enforcement are easier (Raakjær Nielsen 2003). In the Barents Sea en-
forcement could be improved because there were only a limited number of sites where
the fish could be landed. Third, in both cases, relative feelings of deprivation did not
play any significant role, perhaps because there were no major social inequalities that
fishers perceived and felt disadvantaged by. Lastly, we need to mention serendipitous
changes, such as when climate dynamics in the Barents Sea contributed to the growth
and stabilization of the cod stock.
In terms of our two-level model of overfishing it means that the successes in the
Southern Ocean and the Barents Sea can be explained from how non-compliance was
reduced. Overcapacity and non-compliance are individually necessary and jointly suffi-
cient to cause overfishing, which means that non-existence of one of these two will lead
to a reduction of overfishing. It implies that there are two major pathways for interven-
tion: reducing overcapacity or improving compliance. Which one of these to focus on
(or whether to use both) depends crucially on how these factors are embedded within
more remote ecological, social, political, and economical contexts. Orchestrating major
changes in some of these remote factors (e.g. global market economy) often lies beyond
what conventional marine policy can do, which means that it is often more efficient to
instead adapt policies in the light of these changes. Other studies have pointed out how
political or ecological change can create windows of opportunity to deliberately break
undesirable social-ecological feedbacks (Gelcich et al. 2010). Our analysis points out
that being able to do so requires first an identification of leverage points in the causally
complex processes that lead to overfishing.
Towards a convict shuffle
Why does overfishing continue to be a problem? In our search for an answer we
showed how current analyses too strongly emphasize single-factor explanations sug-
gesting that there are only primary causes to consider, such as profit maximization, or
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fishing shows that overfishing becomes obdurate through complex temporal and cross-
scale interactions between the combination of proximate factors – overcapacity and
non-compliance – and a set of highly contextual remote social, economic, political and
ecological factors. The specific dynamic interaction between these factors - the causal
process - differs per case.
Does this make halting overfishing a hopeless cause? We do not think so. Applying
the two-level model that we constructed from comparing our typical and atypical cases
shows that overfishing is not necessarily a deterministic process. Our analysis suggests
that the social-ecological feedbacks underpinning unsustainable or sustainable regimes
can result in either vulnerabilities or opportunities for addressing the problem of over-
fishing. For fisheries management policies this means that there is little hope for a uni-
versal, one-size-fits-all approach to end overfishing. Any policy solution first needs to
understand overfishing as a specific emergent outcome of social-ecological interactions
and feedbacks. With this paper we provide a framework that can identify highly specific
remote factors as well as more generally observed proximate factors that contribute to
overfishing.
Although the identification of causal complexity is done retrospectively, we do believe
that this knowledge can be used to stimulate thinking that can anticipate overfishing
and related stock collapses. Outcomes of historical case study comparisons can be used
to construct ‘historical scenarios’ (Staley 2010). These scenarios are based on the know-
ledge and insights from the comparative historical analysis of overfishing. The purpose
of these scenario exercises is not to predict the future, but to show how human and
environmental forces can interact and in so doing manipulate the future in different
directions. Each scenario describes how these driving forces might plausibly behave in
the future, based on how those forces have behaved in the past (Schwartz 1991). The
scenarios can provide insights into how social context, governance, ecological dynam-
ics, technological progress and human adaptability interact in unique ways with overuse
as a possible outcome (see also Österblom et al. 2013). The historical scenarios can also
stimulate creative thinking about the future, and increase possibilities for reflection
and learning from history among stakeholders that are engaged in natural resource
management.
In ending this paper we would like to return to the chain gang-metaphor we intro-
duced earlier. Prisoners that form a chain gang have to adapt their walking to each
other to avoid tripping. Such an adapted walk is called a ‘convict shuffle’. A ‘chain gang’
also refers to a formation of cyclists, or skaters, who ride closely within each other’s
slipstream, and whereby the lead of the formation rotates frequently. The convict shuf-
fle as well as the cycling formation are such closely integrated groups that no one would
be able to avoid hitting or tripping into one another when pace or direction suddenly
changes. We believe that much the same holds true for fisheries management that aims
to halt overfishing. Just as for cycling or walking in a chain gang, it requires readiness
to adapt to changes in overcapacity and non-compliance stemming from more remote
ecological, social, economic and political causes. But, if we fail to account for and adapt
to the causal complexity of overfishing, we’ll remain chained as fools, and we already
know from the song how that will end: “One of these mornings the chain is gonna break.
But up until the day, I’m gonna take all I can take” (Aretha Franklin 1967).
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